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Cloud computing raises important security
considerations concerning data at rest, in use, and in
transit especially with respect to the manner in which
content level protective controls are enforced while data
is moved from the data holder to the cloud provider.1
While operational responsibility shifts from data
holders2 to the Cloud Service Provider (CSP), the data
owners and holders still have legal responsibility for
setting and implementing the necessary data level
protections, including access and usage controls.3
The strategic management of information assets in
the cloud must be based on fundamental evidentiary
requirements for proving authenticity and reliability.4 In
particular, cloud computing poses three critical legal
problems that are related to the current crises involving
identity authentication, data authenticity and use
authority.
First, there is the crisis involving the capability of
authenticating identity remotely or on-line. The
globalization system is built on integration and speed.5
Both of these require trust in the capability to identify
and authenticate individuals who seek to obtain access
to networks, share information, and sign documents.
Therefore, proving attribution and custodial control are
the main evidentiary concerns for archived documents,
especially when physical connection is not practical or
even possible due to the possession of data by third
parties.6 It is necessary to know who has access to the
digital information held by the cloud provider and
whether alterations were made by that person or entity.
Second, there is the crisis involving the authenticity of
data.7 Because of the ephemeral nature of digital data,
unlimited copying and geographic locations of digital
information, and ubiquity of network access to
documents, distinguishing between authentic and
forged digital records is a central evidentiary concern. It
is useful to know the nature of the evidence that is
required to establish authenticity of digital information
in the cloud.
Third, there is the matter of dealing with the current
crisis regarding authority and control over proprietary
data and information.8 The interconnected global digital
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network-based economy has served as a decentralizing
force.9 No person or entity is in charge.10 Therefore, proof
of control over network access and digital information is
an important evidentiary requirement for establishing
legal responsibility when the data is in the possession
of third parties.11 This is further complicated by social
networking sites used to create and distribute content.
It is necessary to know how the data holder exercises
legal control over digital information held by the CSP,
and how the legal control of business records and
public documents held by CSPs can be enforced.
Federated identity management as a
solution
Identity and access management is crucial to being able
to use any information technology (IT) resource.
Federating the identity management function becomes
essential to provide access to the unlimited IT resources
of multiple providers in the open cloud network
environment. The need for federated identity
management (FIdM) is caused by the emergence and
growth of a global digital network-based information
economy. Using the term ‘Open Government,’ President
Obama’s administration has called for government to
use information technology, including cloud computing12
and web service platforms, to promote greater
participation by the citizen.13 An important component is
the ‘National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace,’14 which recognizes that it is necessary to
ensure all industries and legal entities can rely on
trusted identity credentials to enable them to obtain
secure access and remain in control of their data.15
Additional problems that must be considered include
issues pertaining to jurisdiction.
FIdM is understood to mean a technology framework
for providing trustworthy and convenient identity
credentials for Single Sign On (SSO) open network
access and identity portability.16 The purpose of FIdM is
to ensure that remote access to networks, whether for
viewing, sharing information, signing documents, or
completing transactions, is based on one secure
credential that verifies the identity of the credential
holder and can be trusted by relying parties across
independent security domains.17 Without a FIdM system
that is aligned to the various national signature laws
and emerging industry access control and secure
messaging requirements, individuals everywhere would
need to be in possession of a number of different
identity credentials.18 For example, the bio-
pharmaceutical industry19 and the aerospace and
defense industry20 already require the use of different
digital certificates to participate in secure network
communications.
To utilize a SSO across a number of CSPs and cloud
consumers, an FIdM system requires at least three
entities to establish a level of trust: the credential
holder, the identify provider and the service provider
(i.e. the CSP), as shown in Figure 1.21 To communicate
among themselves and establish the necessary trust,
these entities will require a common protocol. Leading
protocols include SAML (Security Assertion Markup
Language), OpenID, and WS-Federation. They also
utilize the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that employs
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and web sites on the internet between otherwise
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Figure 1. Information Sharing in Federated Identity Management
FIdM contemplates a system of decentralized decision
making and control with respect to credential issuance
and rights of access.22 Therefore, determinations of legal
rights and duties are necessarily contextual according to
the relative access controls of each data holder;23
control and reliability of the credential; and the nature
and superiority of the property interests in the digital
information being collected, used, or disseminated.24 In
this respect, the cloud poses three legal control
challenges to FIdM, set out below.
Legal controls
A legal problem relates to what might be termed
ubiquitous access to digital information in shared
computer networks – and how the data holder with
superior interest asserts sufficient legal controls to
manage and protect digital information assets in the
cloud.25 The term ‘data holder’ includes ‘data owners’
and ‘informational rights owners,’ all of whom have a
relative level of legal control or dominium over the
digital information. The trend for economic value to
move away from goods and services to data collection
and analysis reinforces the need to protect digital data
assets.26 FIdM recognizes that data level control built on
strong assurance of user identity and secure
authentication is necessary in the cloud.27
Controlling access
Where access is based on the issuance of credentials by
a third party, which in turn relies on decisions by the
relying party, it is a matter of grave concern as to who
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Credential Holder
• Stores personal info with ID Provider; 
creates unique authentication token
through ID Provider
• Authorizes ID Provider to share some or
all personal info with Service Provider(s)
• Presents authentication token (e.g.,
username/password, digital certificate,
biometric) to Service Provider for
verification by ID Provider
Service Provider(s)
• Provides method for Credential Holderto
input authentication token
• Passes authentication token data to ID
Provider for verification
• Based on ID Provider's response, grants
Credential Holderaccess to resources
Identity Provider
• Stores personal data about Credential
Holder securely and according to privacy
policy
• Provides method for Service Provider(s)
to verify authentication token of
Credential Holder
• Authenticates Credential Holder's
authentication token
• Shares personal information with
Service Provider(s) about Credential
Holder based on Holder's preferences
and privacy policy
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controls the credentials and sets the access rights to
networks and data.28 This involves security of identity.
FIdM attempts to protect users’ identity information by
establishing the identity provider as a trusted third
party, minimizing the amount of users’ personal data
when obtaining access to multiple systems, and
removing the need for relying parties (or service
providers) to view private data.29 Both the private and
public sectors recognize the fundamental need for trust
by consumers in the cloud network-based global
marketplace.30
Access levels
It is necessary to establish the legal basis to enable a
decision to be made when a person seeks to obtain
access to a service, given that such relationships are
based on the relativity of the data holder’s rights and
duties in digital property.31 Establishing who has the
duty to protect personal information is vital.32 FIdM is
intended to enable the participants in the identity
system to determine the context and relevance of digital
information for the purposes of access rights, usage
rights, and duties of protection.33 Identification enables
third parties to recognize an individual’s identity in the
context of such relationships.34 Therefore,
considerations for determining liability and the
allocation of risk necessarily revolve around the
relationships of access control to the digital data and
the required levels of protection given to the data.
Legal controls for identity federation in 
the cloud
FIdM establishes minimum criteria for issuing,
managing, validating, and securing electronic identity
credentials.
The identity credential
FIdM processes bind the identity of an individual to an
electronic credential. This is crucially important for a
service provider such as a CSP, because it must trust the
origin and integrity of the sender’s electronic record,
including the electronic signature.35 Accurate e-identity,
in turn, rests on the quality of the mechanism used to
obtain the identifying information during the credential
registration and issuance process.36
The use of an identity credential has three purposes:
access, authentication, and attribution. First, an identity
credential can be used as, in effect, a key to allow
authorized individuals to electronically obtain access to
secure networks such as public registries. Second, an
identity credential should authenticate the origin of a
message so that the recipient can better trust the
integrity and identity of the sender as an approved
member of a network or federation. While no foolproof
system exists to guarantee integrity and identity of
electronic data messaging, a higher degree of trust is
required and possible in FIdM than is possible in, for
example, plaintext messaging protocols. Strong and
generally reliable integrity and identity assurance
protocols are vital to secure information exchange.
Third, an identity credential provides a legal means for
an electronic signature to be attributed to the individual
and enables proof of intent to render a legal signature.
We stress that by ‘legal means’ we mean only a
contractually binding mechanism for signature
attribution and presumptive proof of intent.
It follows that the identity credential must be issued
with clear and unambiguous management policies, such
as unique number identifiers, hashing capabilities, and
public revocation lists, so that relying parties anywhere
in the world can have a much higher degree of
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International Telecommunication Union,
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Used Application’ in George Paul, Foundations Of
Digital Evidence (American Bar Association,
2008), Appendix A at162.
36 Patrick McKenna, ‘The Probative value of digital
certificates: Information Assurance is critical to e-
Identity Assurance’, Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review 1 (2004) at 55-
60; Nicholas Bohm and Stephen Mason, ‘Identity
and its verification’ Computer Law & Security
Review, Volume 26, Number 1, January 2010, at
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certificate status information is included in the
digital signature as either a time stamped
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) which indicates
indirectly that the certificate of the signatory was
not revoked prior to the time the signature was
created or an Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) response which checks the actual validity
status of the signatory’s certificate.
42 National e-Notarization Standards, Standards 14
and 15 (National Association of Secretaries of
State, 2006) available at
http://www.nass.org/index.php?option=com_doc
man&task=doc_download&gid=29; First
International Forum on e-Notarization and e-
Apostilles, Conclusions 15 and 18 (National
Notary Association, 2005) available at
http://www.e-app.info. See also, e.g., Code of
Virginia, §47.1-14, which imposes a “duty of care”
on notaries public to keep and maintain the
instruments of office under the exclusive control
of the notary at all times, including any registered
device or algorithm used to create an electronic
notary seal or signature. Every State in the United
States has a similar statutory provision.
43 Jacques Francoeur and Ed Chase, ‘Digital
Assurance and the Digital Chain of Evidence’, at
§ 3 (SAIC and Adobe, 2008) (providing a neutral
technical description of these requirements)
available at http://www.saic.com/news/
resources.asp#.
confidence that the individual’s credential-based
signature belongs to the credential holder and not an
imposter. Ideally, the identity credential will add a layer
of protection against forgery for the content of the
document by means of encryption, hashing, and other
content controls.
Proof of control: Trustmarks
Both public and private sector participants in FIdM
require a visible indicator of third party certification
providers to trust on-line access to networks.37 In
particular, for electronic documents to be reliable over
time, an enduring document-level control and protection
mechanism in the form of a self-verifiable electronic seal
or ‘trustmark’ is considered necessary.38 To maintain its
integrity, ‘the trustmark itself, and the way it is
presented, will be resistant to tampering and forgery;
participants should be able to both visually and
electronically validate its authenticity.’39
The identity assurance system necessarily depends
on the existence of a legally trustworthy and reliable
foundation of document authenticity.40 Accordingly, the
trustmark is a significant component of the identity
system that provides visible evidence of protection
against forgery in much the same way as an official seal.
The trustmark, as an indicator of ownership, control, or
origin, is also self-authenticating under Rule 902(7) of
the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence.
Registries: verification capability
A critical prerequisite before any identity credential
should be relied upon is the verification of its
authenticity. This is achieved by validating the identity
credential with the identity provider or an existing
registry, both of which with FIdM can be accomplished
on-line at the time of use.41 Relying parties need not
know anything (e.g. about PKI) or do anything, such as
make configuration changes to their communications
interface or make any judgments about whether to trust
the digital certificate and its source. The identity
credential should be self-proving, with liability flowing
to the issuer of the credential as a result. The issuer of
the credential, in turn, includes standard
indemnification and hold harmless clauses in its
contractual relationship with the holder of the identity
credential to ward against fraudulent or unauthorized
use. Necessarily, such clauses are subject
internationally to conflicts of law analyses and
sovereign claims of authority that may weaken or
entirely destroy legal protections or obligations.
Nonetheless, such clauses are fundamental to the
issuance of identity credentials, and treaty obligations
or similar international compacts may, in time,
supersede such contractual limitations.
This concept has a tested foundation in the self-
authenticating acts of the notary public. Third parties
relying on electronic notarizations, for example, must be
able to independently verify that the notary’s electronic
credential, in the form of a digital certificate, is actually
being or has been used only by the individual to whom
the notary commission was issued by the appropriate
jurisdiction.42
For validation to be automatic, critical information
relating to the trust to be given to the document must
already be included in the signature itself and the
application in which the document is created.43 It is
possible to achieve this by using the current
improvements of the most recent versions of the
relevant application (for instance, Adobe). Ideally, the
signature validation process should simply involve two
steps – opening the document and looking for the ‘valid’
indication icon that states the document is authentic
(normally a green check mark). Any actions beyond this
are more than the relying party should be expected or
legally obligated to do. As stated above, compromises
of this system of trust (by malware or other third party
attacks) can be legally protected against contractually,
which carries certain limitations and risks
internationally. International standards of encryption
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and hashing algorithms and corresponding secure
messaging standards help alleviate this issue
technologically, but the legal problem of the recognition
of secure electronic signatures internationally remains
to be resolved legally and technologically.
Controlling access to the cloud
Legal control of the credential
The subject or credential holder has the right to use the
credential, and therefore has some form of control over
the credential, pursuant to a contractual agreement with
the identity provider.44 The credential provider controls
the access rights, including usage restrictions and
revocation. In effect, the credential provider licensees
use of the credential to the credential holder, who
maintains physical possession.45 The credential holder
must immediately notify the provider should the
credential be lost or stolen. As with credit cards or other
similar credential policies governed both by domestic
statutes and contracts between the issuer and holder of
the credential, a credential holder should not be held
liable for the unauthorized and unknown use of an
identity credential, providing the credential holder
exercises reasonable care in safeguarding access to the
credential. Further, technological policies and
procedures must be in place and testable by reliable
audit procedures to protect the continued use of a
reported lost or stolen credential.
Credential legal control requirements also may be met
by the use of trusted third party registries approved and
audited by federation operators such as CertiPath,
SAFE, Kantara, and FiXs.46
Credential governance in existing identity
federations
U.S. Government: PIV-I 
The Personal Identity Verification – Interoperable (‘PIV-
I’) smartcard can be issued by non-federal identity
providers while taking advantage of the federal high
identity assurance standards.47 Widespread adoption is
expected because of federal government requirements
for federal employees and contractors;48 federal
requirements for the full implementation of electronic
medical records in the healthcare system,49 and
commercial availability of smart telephones with PIV-I
authentication and signing capabilities.
The PIV-I credential is issued and secured in
accordance with an assurance level equivalent or
greater to what the U.S. federal authorities refer to as
Medium Assurance Hardware -- Federal Bridge Cross
Certified.50 An understanding of the reliance on the
certificate for this assurance level includes the
following:
1. ‘This level is relevant to environments where threats
to data are high or the consequences of the failure
of security services are high. This may include very
high value transactions or high levels of fraud risk.’51
2.‘Relying Parties must evaluate the environment and
the associated threats and vulnerabilities and
determine the level of risk they are willing to accept
based on the sensitivity or significance of the
information. This evaluation is done by each Relying
Party for its application and is not controlled by this
CP.’52
3.‘A Relying Party uses a Subscriber’s certificate to
verify the integrity of a digitally signed message, to
identify the creator of a message, or to establish
confidential communications with the Subscriber.
The Relying Party is responsible for deciding
whether or how to check the validity of the
certificate by checking the appropriate certificate
status information. A Relying Party may use
information in the certificate (such as certificate
policy identifiers) to determine the suitability of the
certificate for a particular use.’53
That certification level is based on a high standard of
reliability defined by the Federal PKI Management
Authority.54 PIV-I assumes that the operational reliability
44 For examples of this arrangement, see the
certificate policies of CertiPath, Inc. and SAFE-
Biopharma Association.
45 For examples of this arrangement, see the
certificate policies of CertiPath, Inc. and SAFE-
Biopharma Association.
46 Possible future work on electronic commerce –
Proposal of the United States of America on
electronic transferable records, United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (June 18,
2009) at 5 (pertaining to electronic transferable
records). See also, UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS
ACT (‘UETA’) § 16 Comment 3 (National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws 1999). The UETA has been adopted in every
state and the District of Columbia except Illinois,
New York, and Washington.
47 Smart Card Alliance, ‘Personal Identity
Verification Interoperability (PIV-I) for Non-
Federal Issuers: Trusted Identities for Citizens
across States, Counties, Cities, and Businesses,’
(January 2011) at 4, available at
http://www.securitysales.com/files/PIV-I-White-
Paper-012811.pdf.
48 For which, see OMB 11-11 and HSPD 12.
49 Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act, (HITECH ACT) of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
50 Appropriate uses for relying parties are described
in the X.509 Certificate Policy for the Federal
Bridge Certification Authority (Version 2.17 June
10, 2010) Section 1.4.1, available at
http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/document
s/FBCA_CP_RFC3647.pdf.
51 1.4.1, p 10.
52 1.4.1, p 8.
53 1.3.6, p 8.
54 http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkia/.
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of the issuing Certificate Authority can be determined
and meets a specific assurance level. The reliability of
the Certificate Authority is in part defined by its
governing Certificate Policy or Certificate Practice
Statement and independent third party audit
assessments, which states that ‘when a PKI cross-
certifies with the Federal PKI Architecture, and is an
affiliate in good standing, a Relying Party operating an
on-line application that utilizes digital certificates for
electronic identity authentication may choose to trust
that PKI’s digital certificates at the Level(s) of Assurance
asserted by those certificates. No other trust
requirements are needed for the Relying Party to make
that determination.’55 PIV-I is intended to enhance the
privacy of the citizen in the process of establishing a
credential by protecting against loss, alteration, or
destruction of personal information.56
Private sector identity federation implementations 
Control requirements for credentials are being met in
some industries with the use of trusted third parties in
the form of federation operators such as CertiPath,
SAFE, FiXs, and Kantara.57 All of these entities set rules
and commercial terms that enable participants to
evaluate trusted identity.
Certipath and SAFE are examples of open FIdM
business system models in which participants must
contractually agree to comply with all the rules
governing the issuance of use of the identity
credentials.58 In the open system, the rules are not
publicly available to nonmembers, and the parties have
flexibility to use the credentials in ways that are not
envisaged by the federation operator. Certipath
develops and oversees digital certificate policies for the
aerospace and defense industry largely for purpose of
secure information sharing. SAFE performs this role for
pharmaceutical and healthcare industries and approves
member use of digital certificates that will meet global
regulatory compliance requirements.
FiXs and Kantara are examples of closed FIdM
business system models in which the federation
operators have greater ability to limit both participation
and credential usage. FiXs performs this role for
government contractors and denies benefits to any third
party that is not contractually bound with the federation
operator. The Kantara Initiative federation model does
not use a registry or third party audit or enforcement
procedures.59 Nor does it actually operate as a
federation. Rather it recommends a policy framework for
‘circles of trust’ that participants must agree to in some
unspecified contractual form.60
ACES (Access Certificates for Electronic Services) was
created and sponsored by the federal Government
Services Administration to enable secure on-line access
to GSA services and other government entity services.
ACES relies on the use of digital certificates and a public
key infrastructure to identify participants and digitally
sign data in an attempt to make transactions non-
repudiable. ACES transactions can occur between
business and government and consumer and
government, and government agency participation is
voluntary.
International – Notaries
Civil law notaries generate large amounts of data that is
entered and stored in a variety of public and private
registers.61 Moreover, cross border circulation and
recognition of notarized non-public documents,
especially powers of attorney, is a regular notarial
practice greatly facilitated by the use of electronic
registers.62 Parties in other jurisdictions can rely on the
notarized document and may verify the notary’s identity
and office holder status through the use of an FIdM
system of smartcards issued by certificate authorities
owned by a notary society, and cloud-based centralized
data management services.63 Estonia, Italy, and British
Columbia currently use cloud-based notarial services
that undertake the execution and filing of electronic
land records.
The notary society or organization in each country
55 Note the explanation provided by the Federal
Bridge Certification Authority, available at
http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkia/crosscert.cf
m.
56 Smart Card Alliance, ‘Personal Identity
Verification Interoperability (PIV-I) for Non-
Federal Issuers: Trusted Identities for Citizens
across States, Counties, Cities, and Businesses,’
at 5.
57 See the digital certificate requirements of SAFE-
Biopharma Association, available at
http://www.safe-biopharma.org/ and the digital
certificate requirements of CertiPath, Inc.,
available at http://www.certipath.com and the
Transglobal Secure Collaboration Program,
http://www.tscp.org. See also FiXs Trust Model
Version 3.0, September 1, 2010.
58 For further information about existing open
systems, see The Four Bridges Forum available at
http://www.the4bf.com/ (FIdM examples in
aerospace, defense, biopharmaceutical,
healthcare, and higher education).
59 Jeff Nigriny and Randy V. Sabett, ‘The Third-Party
Assurance Model: A Legal Framework for
Federated Identity Management’, at 519. 
60 Jeff Nigriny and Randy V. Sabett, ‘The Third-Party
Assurance Model: A Legal Framework for
Federated Identity Management, at 519-520’.
61 Ugo Bechini and Dominik Gassen, ‘A New
Approach to Improving the Interoperability of
Electronic Signatures in Cross-Border Legal
Transactions’, 17 Michigan State Journal of
International Law, Issue 3 (2009) at 4.
62 Ugo Bechini and Dominik Gassen, ‘A New
Approach to Improving the Interoperability of
Electronic Signatures in Cross-Border Legal
Transactions’, at 14-15.
63 Ugo Bechini and Dominik Gassen, ‘A New
Approach to Improving the Interoperability of
Electronic Signatures in Cross-Border Legal
Transactions’, at 5. Leading examples have been
are the Notaries of Italy, France, and Estonia.
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must issue the digital certificates to the member
notaries.64 The notary societies also are responsible for
creating procedures to determine how those credentials
will be managed, renewed, and revoked. The
International Union of Latin Notaries (UINL) has
specified that ‘Notaries should obtain an electronic
signature with a high level of security, accredited by a
recognized certificate, using a safe signature creation
device. To do so, it will be advisable to proceed to
generate the signature verification and creation data, by
the certification authority, and its delivery to the notary
under the control of the competent notarial authority.’65
This mirrors the practices currently used by Notary
Societies in many nations, including Italy, Germany,
Argentina, Spain, Estonia, Brazil, Mexico, and Austria.
Notaries Societies in the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Turkey plan to implement similar electronic notarial
practices.
To preserve a trustworthy authentication function for
the digital certificate, UINL policies make the notary
responsible for the use, protection, and control of the
digital signature.66 Specifically, notaries must use a
secure electronic signature creation device.67 Notaries
risk recall or suspension of their certificates upon
disclosure of the confidential password that controls
use of the digital signature.68 No one other than the
named notary may use the digital signature.69
The UINL has also taken the position that the notary
societies of each country must give relying parties the
ability to verify the notary’s digital signature: ‘ Whereas
for the free international circulation of electronic
notarial deeds there must be a general method for
verifying the signature and the capacity of the presiding
notary, we request that the certification of the notary’s
digital signature remain under the control of the
member notariats, whilst observing the principals and
methods which are developed for such verification on a
global level.’70 This verification capability should also be
quick and simple and permit real-time authentication of
the notary’s digital signature.71 The Council of the
Notaries of the European Union (CNUE) has already
developed and piloted an internet platform that will
allow relying parties to verify the digital signatures of
European notaries.72
Limitation of liability for credential governance
The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace has identified liability limitation for identity
credential providers as an important issue for FIdM.
Specifically, the National Strategy posed the question
whether there should be limits on liability or monetary
damage caps on identity providers in the event of
fraudulent use of the tokens.73 Currently, risk allocation
and any attempted limitation of liability amongst the
participants in FIdM is achieved through contract.74 No
state level statutes in the United States currently
address risk allocation other than in the context of the
electronic signatures.75 A model for federal statutory
limitation of liability exists in maritime law with respect
to ship owner and charter liability for loss and damages
involving cargo and passengers.76 On the basis of this
provision, loss claims with respect to the sinking of the
Titanic were limited to the value of the remaining
lifeboats.77
Virginia has become the first U.S. state to introduce
legislation to clarify and limit the liability of private
federation operators, identity credential providers, and
credential holders.78 The legislation79 would give
federation operators and identity providers immunity
from legal action for identity credentials issued ‘in
accordance with the specifications of the U.S. Federal
Bridge Certification Authority’ unless they were grossly
negligent or engaged in willful misconduct. However,
64 See the ‘Certification Policy for the Notarial
Electronic Signature of Member States of the
International Union of Latin Notaries (U.I.N.L)’
from the 2004 Congress held in Mexico City. The
notarial electronic signature ‘should be protected
by a certificate issued under the control and
responsibility of the notarial authority in each
member state of the U.I.N.L.’
65 XXIV International Congress of Latin Notaries,
Conclusions of the Working Group for Theme II
‘The Notary and electronic contracts’ (2004),
available at http://www.uinl.org.
66 See the Code of Virginia, §47.1-14, for a corollary
US statutory provision.
67 ‘Certification Policy for the Notarial Electronic
Signature of Member States of the International
Union of Latin Notaries (U.I.N.L),’ policy number
2, from the 2004 Congress held in Mexico City
and available at http://www.uinl.org.
68 ‘Certification Policy for the Notarial Electronic
Signature of Member States of the International
Union of Latin Notaries (U.I.N.L),’ policy number 7.
69 ‘Certification Policy for the Notarial Electronic
Signature of Member States of the International
Union of Latin Notaries (U.I.N.L),’ policy number 7.
70 XXIV International Congress of Latin Notaries,
‘Conclusions of the Working Group for Theme II’
(2004), available at http://www.uinl.org.
71 Bernard Reynis and Ugo Bechini, ‘European Civil
Law Notaries Ready to Launch International
Digital Deeds’, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review 4 (2007) at 14-18.
72 Ugo Bechini and Dominik Gassen, ‘A New
Approach to Improving the Interoperability of
Electronic Signatures in Cross-Border Legal
Transactions’, 17 Michigan State Journal of
International Law, Issue 3 (2009) at 14-18.
73 National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace, at 31.
74 Jeff Nigriny and Randy V. Sabett, ‘The Third-Party
Assurance Model: A Legal Framework for
Federated Identity Management’, at 512, 521-22
and 534.
75 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 175/5-110 and WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.320 and 321 (digital
signatures only). Note the comparative
international discussion of electronic signature
risk allocation in Stephen Mason, Electronic
Signatures in Law (Tottel, 2nd edn, 2007) Chapter 9.
76 46 U.S.C.A § 183. Note Paul M. Barrett, ‘Success
is never having to say you’re sorry’, Bloomberg
Businessweek, 4 July 2011 at 56 and 59,
Transocean, the company that owned and ran the
Deepwater Horizon oil drilling vessel that
exploded and sank on April 20, 2010, has invoked
this statute in an attempt to cap the company’s
liability for resulting deaths and personal injuries.
77 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor (The
Titanic), 233 U.S. 718 (1914).
78 HB 2259, available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-
bin/legp504.exe?111+ful+HB2259.
79 Incorporated in the form of amendments to the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act.
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identity credential providers would be liable for
damages for failure to revoke after notice or for failure
to terminate after expiration. The legislation would also
make the credential holders liable for failing to notify
the identity credential provider of loss of control or
unauthorized access. The identity credential provider
would bear the risk of loss in the event that the
credential holder is not aware that the credential has
been compromised.
Maritime law as model for determining legal
control
Maritime law provides a useful example of an existing
global commercial network that has allocated liability
based on legal control factors.80 Overseas shipping,
including the transport of cargo and passengers as well
as fisheries and offshore resources, is the oldest
commercial network and one with an extensively
developed body of law and practices.
The maritime model has implications for determining
the allocation of risk in the context of CSPs and third
party outsourcing.81 For example, the federation
operator functions, in effect, like a ship registry in
setting standards for and certifying participants. The
federation operator also signals to relying parties the
assurance levels and associated Certificate Policies to
which the token is bound, analogous to the manner in
which a vessel’s flag indicates the set of national laws
under which it is operating. Similar to the requirement
of seaworthiness, for parties relying on credential
tokens, determination of the applicable assurance level
is highly contextual.
Adapting the maritime model to FIdM has interesting
law and policy implications. First, the maritime model
suggests that control rights over digital data in a
commercial network are determined by the relative
ownership interests and access control relations of
persons and entities (e.g. the various data holders).
Second, by analogizing ownership and control of a
vessel to that of an identity credential, the maritime
model provides a framework that separates out the risk
allocation involving the credentials themselves, the
relative data holder access control status, and any
required protection duties for the particular data being
accessed, used, or transmitted. Finally, the maritime
model provides examples of regulatory liability
limitation approaches that could be used in the FIdM
scheme.
Determining cloud access and use levels 
Dominium: data holder control rights
Digital data is property.82 Dominium over property has
the following aspects: possession or hold, use, and
disposal.83 Data holder rights are contextual according
80 For instance, see United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (United
Nations, Vienna 2009); United Nations
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea
(Hamburg Rules) (1978).
81 John R. Pagan, ‘English Carriers’ Common-Law
Right to Reject Undeclared Cargo: The Myth of
the Closed-Container Conundrum’, 23 William
and Mary Law Review, Issue 4, (1982) at791 (‘The
shipper-carrier relationship is a species of
bailment for hire.’).
82 See, e.g. VA CODE ANN § 18.2-152.2; Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins., 8 N.Y.3d 283, 292-293
(2007); Clark Street Wine & Spirits v. Emporos
Systems Corp. (E.D.N.Y. 11-29-2010); Anssi
Hoikkanen, Margherita Bacigalupo, Ramón
Compañó, Wainer Lusoli and Ioannis Maghiros,
‘New Challenges and Possible Policy Options for
the Regulation of Electronic Identity’, at 6;
domain names are intangible property under
California law. Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024,
1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (as with the majority of
states to have addressed the issue, California law
recognizes a property interest in domain names
making them subject to conversion claims), to
this end, ‘courts generally hold that domain
names are subject to the same laws as other
types of intangible property.’ Jonathan D. Hart,
Internet Law: A Field Guide (Bna Books, 2008) at
120. See, also, Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596
F.3d 696, 701-02 (9th Cir. 2010) (domain name is
subject to receivership in the district of domain
name registrar) and Greg Lastowska, Virtual
Justice: The New Laws of Online Worlds, at 5
(discussion of evolving application of property
law to virtual world and on-line gaming context).
83 E.g. Smith v. Furbish, 68 N.H. 123 (1894) at 144;
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: the
impact of the Protestant Reformations on the
western legal tradition, (Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2003) at 167-170. In the
development of the common law, dominium had
formally meant not only rights in land or chattels
but also lordship over persons. Property was not
‘owned’ in the modern sense but rather ‘held’ in
a form of tenure with the rights of possession,
use, and disposal depending on the relationship
between the landholder and duties owed to
superiors or privileges owed by subordinates in
the hierarchy. In the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, the concept of ownership was
separated from lordship. A similar system of
multiple property interest holders in the same
property has existed in Japan, for which see Peter
Duus, Feudalism in Japan, (Knopf, NY, 1976) at
34-35. The hierarchy of Shiki rights enabled a
large number of people to share in the
agricultural surpluses in the land, which was the
chief economic value. See also, J. H. Baker, An
Introduction to English Legal History (London
Butterworths, 1979) at 194-97.
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to the relativity and overriding nature of property
interests and the nature of the data itself.84 There are
four categories (See Figure 2 on previous page.)
1. Allodial (information rights ownership and title
ownership not subject to intellectual property,
licensing, privacy, confidentiality, constitutional,
regulatory, or other restrictions)85
2.Tenurial (copyhold ownership, possession and
control, subject to intellectual property, licensing,
privacy, confidentiality, constitutional, regulatory, or
other restrictions)86
3.Custodial (care or charge of another’s property)87
4.Bailment (lawful possession for hire and protection
of another’s property)88
The rights of the data holders to exercise persistent
control over the data (legal ability to set authorization
and access rights to digital data) have been grouped
into two categories:
Access (encryption and preventive viewing/disclosure
controls; authorization controls; strong
authentication; audit capability; and, binding of
access rights policy to data), and
Usage (rights management, copying, print screen,
expiration, editing, saving, sending, and retention).89
Obligations to control: the holder of the data 
Obligations to protect data that can be viewed in use, at
rest, or transit over open networks arise from four main
sources:
1. Contract (bailment, license use, and Service Level
Agreements).
2.Tort (conversion90 and confidentiality laws).
3.Regulatory (privacy and data protection laws
governing authorized access and usage).
4.Constitutional (right to informational privacy).91
These protection duties function as limitations on the
data holder’s status and property interests. Accordingly,
all data holders are subject to these contextual
obligations.92
Similarly, identity information and privacy challenges
84 Greg Lastowska, Virtual Justice: The New Laws of
Online Worlds, at 127 (‘A web of overlapping and
complex legal interests in things is preferable to
an atomized regime of single owners with
absolute private rights.’). Harold J. Berman, Law
and Revolution II: the impact of the Protestant
Reformations on the western legal tradition, at
170. In the modern common law, these are
characterized as dominium or a right in a thing
and the law of obligations. This could also be
described as a relativity of ownership similar to
the holder status found in the feudal system: Sir
Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland,
The History of English Law Before the Time of
Edward I, Volume 2 (2nd edn, 1899) at 80-81.
85 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, 2009), 88.
Allodial is defined as ‘held in absolute
ownership.’ See also, UNIF. COMPUTER
INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (‘UCITA’) §
102 Comment 34 (National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 2002)
(Informational rights ‘includes ‘intellectual
property’ rights. It also includes rights created
under any law that gives a person a right to
control use of information independent of
contract, such as may be developing in privacy
law.’). The UCITA has been adopted in Maryland
and Virginia.
86 J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal
History, at 194: ‘The notion of tenure, though it
no longer affects the ownership of land, has been
the foundation of the law of real property for nine
centuries’ See, e.g., UCITA § 501 Comment 2
(‘Ownership (title) to a copy is distinguished
from ownership of intellectual property
rights…While obtaining ownership of a copy may
give the copy owner some rights with respect to
that copy, it does not convey ownership of the
underlying intellectual property rights in a work
of authorship, a patented invention or other
intellectual property. The copy is merely a conduit
for use, but not ownership, of rights.’).
87 Black’s Law Dictionary, at 441. Custody is defined
as ‘the care and control of a thing or person for
inspection, preservation, or security.’ A record
custodian has been given charge of a document.
88 Black’s Law Dictionary, at 161. A bailee is defined
as ‘a person who receives personal property from
another, and has possession of but not title to
the property. A bailee is responsible for keeping
the property safe until it is returned to the
owner.’
89 Cloud Security Alliance Security Guidance for
Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing V2.1
(December 2009). See also, VA CODE ANN 59.1-
501.2 (38).
90 The CSP that loses data or has processes that
alter data without authorization may be liable for
conversion: for instance, see Thyroff v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 403-04
(2d Cir. 2006) (a digital data owner is unable to
retrieve customer and other personal information
in the possession of a third party storage
provider). Conversion is the ‘unauthorized
assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over goods belonging to another to
the exclusion of the owner's rights’ (quoting
Vigilant Ins. Co of Am. v. Housing Auth., 87 N.Y.2d
36, 44 (1995). This includes an unauthorized
exercise of dominion over the property or
interference with it, in derogation of the data
owner’s rights.
91 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: the
impact of the Protestant Reformations on the
western legal tradition, at 169-70 and 216-17. In
the modern common law, these are classified as
contractual, quasi-contractual, tort, and
regulatory obligations.
92 For an example of Levels of Protection geared
specifically to the protective needs of identity
information, see the white paper entitled Levels
of Protection (LOP) by Mary Rundle and Susan
Glueck (2010), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/endtoendt
rust/vision/lop.aspx. See also, OIX Advisory
Board and the OIX Legal Policy Group, ‘Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPP) Comparison
Tool.’ Draft 0.5 October 7, 2010, at 7-25 (using
the terms ‘data handler’ to denote a party that
‘performs an action with respect to data, for
which a duty is imposed’ under a privacy
provision’). Another example is the lawyer’s
ethical duty to preserve the confidentiality of
client information from inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure, discussed in James
McCauley, Cloud Computing – A Silver Lining or
Ethical Thunderstorm for Lawyers? VIRGINIA
LAWYER, Vol. 59 (February 2011) at 49-52.
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are best approached in a contextual manner.93 For
example, in the credential issuance process, an
information privacy interest is not violated when a
government credential provider requires the disclosure
of personal information concerning criminal and medical
history and professional references.94 It is important to
note that violation of privacy protections does not
implicate rights and duties of property ownership. ‘A
claim of privacy is not the same as a claim of
ownership.’95 However, a privacy interest in the control
of personal information is recognized as giving a data
holder the duty to protect from unauthorized use and
dissemination.96
Practical guidance
The challenge facing the global move toward the cloud
is establishing a uniform and trustworthy approach for
issuing and managing individuals’ electronic identity
credentials and usage rights. The benefit to an end user
is simple: access to numerous applications and services
provided across domains and organizations using the
same authentication credential. With FIdM, the users
and service providers can rely upon a single identity
provider to manage the credential and on-line identity
securely.
For the economic and secure functioning of the cloud
network-based global economy, it will be useful to
develop standardized e-identity credentials. Without
this, it is likely that individuals will be faced with having
to purchase a number of different credentials to perform
a variety of tasks. Private credential issuers,
governmental users, and existing federation operators
are in the best position to create such a uniform, global
standard that will give the cloud the necessary degree
of security, trust, and reliability.
The identity credential can also provide for the
encryption of data with a key that only the user is in
possession of before uploading it to on-line storage or
other applications. This should be done in a manner
such that the CSP does not possess the private key to
obtain access to the encrypted data.97 A CSP should
‘claim no ownership rights in customer data and should
use customer data only as its customers instruct or to
fulfill contractual or legal obligations,’ and so in effect,
function as a bailee with responsibility to protect the
digital information owned by another.98
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93 For a discussion of the contextual nature of
identity, see the comments of Nicholas Bohm,
‘Watch what you sign!’, Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 (2006) at 45-
49. For an analysis of the contextual nature of
privacy disruptions as broken down into the
categories of information collection, information
processing, information dissemination, and
invasion of privacy, see Daniel J. Solove,
Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press,
2008) at 9-10, 103-5.
94 National Aeronautics v. Nelson, 131 S.Ct.746
(2011) (United States government employee
background check does not violate any
constitutional right to information privacy or
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure because it
was reasonable in light of internal security
interests and the substantial statutory
protections against public dissemination).
95 Daniel J. Solove, Understanding Privacy, at 28.
96 Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 09-1723 (4th Cir. 7-26-
2010) at 32-34 (recognizing a protected
informational privacy interest in the use and
dissemination of personal information).
97 Peter Ferenczi, The Cloud Has Eyes, LAPTOP, April
2008 at 20.
98 James McCauley, Cloud Computing – A Silver
Lining or Ethical Thunderstorm for Lawyers?, at
51-52.
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